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Abstract
This article studies the impact of the 2008 economic crisis on the Irish development 
model. The Republic of Ireland has developed its economy thanks to an FDI-led strategy. This 
strategy was very successful during the Celtic Tiger period in the 1990s and 2000s. Will the 
crisis put an end to Ireland’s economic development? If Ireland manages to keep a low corpo-
rate tax rate, it appears that the country will be able to carry on with its development model. 
However, Ireland seems to have almost achieved its catching up with the EU core countries 
and it will be difficult to reach growth rates similar to those of the Celtic Tiger period.
Keywords: crisis, economic development, GNP, Celtic Tiger, FDI, European Union.
Résumé
L’Irlande a développé son économie à travers une politique d’ouverture économique et d’attrac-
tion des IDE dont le point d’orgue a été le Tigre celtique dans les années 1990 et 2000. Cet article 
étudie l’impact de la crise économique de 2008 sur le modèle de développement économique irlan-
dais. Il apparaît que le modèle peut encore être valide, si l’Irlande parvient à préserver sa politique 
fiscale. Toutefois, il est peu probable que le pays puisse encore espérer des taux de croissance nettement 
plus élevés que le reste de l’UE car l’Irlande a fini son rattrapage économique.
Mots clés : crise, développement économique, PNB, tigre celtique, IDE, Union Européenne.
Ireland is one of the European countries that was hit hard by the 2008 crisis: 
the Irish State had to nationalize several banks and then had to be rescued by the 
Troika formed by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund in 2010. It took only two years for the country 
to go nearly bankrupt after the fifteen years of prosperity under the Celtic Tiger 
period. Irish people had tobear the brunt of the reforms whereas they had thought 
that such times were over after being the euro area’s fastest-growing country in 
terms of GNP per capita and having a net inflow of workers.
What is the reality of the crisis for Ireland? How did the country rise and fall? 
Was the crisis only the implosion of a real estate bubble or does it mark the end of 
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Ireland’s economic development? What does the future of Ireland look like, what 
could its new development model be and what should its ambition be?
• The Rise and Fall of the Celtic Tiger
In September 2008, Ireland was the first country of the euro zone to enter 
recession1. It happened after fifteen years of exceptional growth and fast economic 
development, often called the Celtic Tiger. During that period, Ireland had been 
the euro area’s fastest-growing and one of the richest countries in terms of GNP 
per capita2. The crisis occurred after decades of political and economic efforts to 
catch up with the EU member states.
Figure 1: GNP per capita3 – Ireland and EU Core Countries (adjusted for inlation and at purchasing power pa-
rity) (calculations based on Eurostat: AMECO [Annual macro-economic database] of “Total population [Natio-
nal accounts] [NPTD]” and “Gross national income at current market prices per head of population [HVGNP])
1.  OECD, “Quarterly Growth Rates of real GDP, change over previous quarter”: -2% for Q2 2008 and -0,8% for 
Q3 2008, [http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=350#], retrieved on 8 March 2015.
2.  Eurostat, “Total population (National accounts) (NPTD)” and “Gross national income at current market prices 
per head of population (HVGNP), AMECO (Annual macro-economic database).
3.  Traditionally GNP provides a better measure of economic activity in Ireland because of income lows to non-
residents, especially proits and dividends of foreign direct investment enterprises. For example, while in most 
EU countries the diference is just a couple of percentage points, in Ireland in 2007, GDP was as much as 23% 
higher than GNP. Even if we are aware that even GNP is now distorted because of the proit lows of redomiciled 
public limited companies (such as Accenture), in this article, GNP at constant price (adjusted for inlation and at 
purchasing power parity) is used to enable comparisons between EU countries. [http://econproph.com/2010/11/26/
gdp-vs-gnp/], [http://www.infacts.ie/irishinancenews/article_1025998.shtml], retrieved on 10 March 2015.
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he GNP per capita is adjusted for inlation and at purchasing power parity, which is usually considered 
as an acceptable proxy for the development of a country. he vertical scale of this graph is logarithmic, as a 
consequence a set of data with constant growth rate shows on this graph as a straight line.
From the 1960s to the 1980s, the Republic of Ireland lagged behind EU core 
countries (Austria, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg, 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the UK) as shown in graph 14. Slowly but stea-
dily, the policies implemented since 19585 enabled Ireland’s GNP per capita to 
grow, with a clear acceleration around 1994, to the point of catching up with the 
other EU member states in the early 2000s and exceeding the EU’s core countries 
in 2003 in terms of GNP per capita at constant prices. Between 2001 and 2007, 
GNP growth rates averaged 5.6%6. At the end of the Celtic Tiger period, in 
2007, only three countries of the European Union (Luxembourg, Sweden and the 
Netherlands) had a GNP per capita higher than Ireland’s7. Ireland also managed 
to reduce its public debt from 110% of economic output in 1987 to 24% in 
2007, then the second-lowest in the euro zone8. Finally in 2007, at the end of the 
Celtic Tiger period, the general government balance was marginally positive9.
In a nutshell, within four or five decades, Ireland was transformed from a poor 
country into a highly successful economy. Its development model was praised, 
studied and copied by many emerging economies like the eight countries of 
Central Europe which joined the EU in 200410. After this period of fast growth, 
in the mid-2000s, several world financial institutions forecast a soft landing for 
the Celtic Tiger within 5 to 10 years:
he view of the [Central Bank of Ireland] was that Irish economic 
growth would continue, albeit at a lower rate, and that, despite the inci-
pient downturn in the property sector, there would be a soft landing for 
the Irish economy. his benign assessment mirrored those made by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union (EU), and the 
4.  Graph 1 is based on the 28 countries of the EU. he author compares the Irish situation with EU core countries 
(Austria, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the UK). 
Calculations based on Eurostat, AMECO, op. cit.
5.  In the late 1950s and 1960s, T.K. Whitaker and S. Lemass opened Ireland to the world through 3 schemes: trade 
barriers were removed, FDI was attracted, the EEC membership was secured, and investments in education 
were made. Vanessa Boullet, La planiication en Irlande (1958-1972), méthodologies et mythologie de la modernisa-
tion économique, 2008, Université de Paris Ouest-Nanterre-La Défense, hèse.
6.  OECD, “Quarterly Growth Rates of real GDP, change over previous quarter”, op. cit.
7.  Calculations based on Eurostat, AMECO, op.cit.
8.  Arthur Beesley, “National debt and its servicing still weigh heavily on State”, he Irish Times, 16 November 
2014.
9.  Eurostat, “General government deicit and surplus – annual data”. [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=
table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=teina200], retrieved on 8 March 2015.
10.  “he Irish economy, a model of success”, he Economist, 14 October 2004.
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Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
around the same time11.
Not all economists did agree with the point of view of such worldwide finan-
cial institutions. In 2007, Morgan Kelly wrote:
he expected fall in average real house prices is in the range 40 to 
60 per cent, over a period of around 8 years. […] Given the unusual 
reliance of the Irish economy on building houses, the efects of any such 
fall on national income may be somewhat larger than that experienced at 
the end of other housing bubbles12.
Indeed, the Republic of Ireland suffered a rather hard landing, sooner than 
expected. On September 15, 2008, the financial services firm Lehman Brothers 
collapsed. The Irish housing bubble burst shortly afterwards, triggering a cascade 
of events: the Irish banking system was endangered to the point that the Irish 
government had to announce an unconditional guarantee of €440 billion for 
most liabilities of Ireland’s seven major banks; unemployment more than tripled 
to 14.4% in 201113; the Irish GNP per capita shrank by almost 10% in 2008 
and by another 12% in 200914. The State’s balance sheet was also hit hard: tax 
revenue receded as, according to Antoin E. Murphy, “government revenue had 
become hugely over-dependent on taxes related to property transactions – inclu-
ding stamp duty, capital gains tax, VAT, and direct taxes levied on the property 
sector15”. The public debt of the Republic, which stood at 24% in 2007, steadily 
rose during the crisis to 123% of the GDP16. On November 21, 2010, Ireland 
petitioned the EU for a bailout. A financial rescue plan of €90 billion, almost 
60% of Ireland’s 2010 GDP, in the form of a three-year loan, was negotiated with 
the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (the “Troika”).
Between 2008 and 2010, nobody in Ireland was untouched by the crisis. Irish 
families had to make many sacrifices as public services budgets were cut down: 
“Over the course of the adjustment period, the combined effects of the cuts in 
11.  Antoin E. Murphy, “he Fall of the Celtic Tiger, Ireland and the Euro Debt Crisis”, Presentation of the 
authors’ book, p. 3. [https://www.qub.ac.uk/home/ResearchandEnterprise/BusinessNetworks/FileStore/
Filetoupload,442419,en.pdf], retrieved on 08/03/2015.
12.  Morgan Kelly, “On the likely extent of falls in Irish house prices”, Quaterly Economic Commentary, Special 
Article, July 2007, Dublin Economic and Social Research Institute, p. 53.
13.  Unemployment rose from 4.6% to 6.1% in 2007, to 11.8% in 2009, to 13.7% in 2010 and 15.1% in 2012. 
CSO, Seasonally Adjusted Standardised Unemployment Rates, [http://www.cso.ie/en/statistics/labourmarket/
principalstatistics/seasonallyadjustedstandardisedunemploymentratessur/], retrieved on 8 March 2015.
14.  Calculations based on Eurostat, AMECO, op. cit.
15.  Antoin E. Murphy, op. cit., p. 6.
16.  Eurostat, “General government gross debt - annual data, [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&in
it=1&language=en&pcode=teina225&plugin=1], retrieved on 08 March 2015.
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welfare rates and increases in taxes meant that most people experienced a fall in 
income of around 10 per cent17.” Moreover, net emigration which had stopped in 
1995 with the rise of the Celtic Tiger started increasing again on a very sizeable 
scale in 2010, (the net migration balance amounting to -27,500 people18). Thus, 
Manfred Gärtner, Björn Griesbach, and Giulia Mennillo concluded that “the 
achievements of 20 years of economic reforms, budgetary discipline and consen-
sus under the Celtic Tiger had been lost in as little as four years19”. Finally, the 
self-confidence that Ireland had during the Celtic Tiger was all but gone:
All of that conidence has ebbed away. Ireland today seems a vulne-
rable and anxious place, its uncertain future tied to borrowing and bai-
louts, the sheer size of which set the head reeling. Suddenly, too, the 
spectre of the old, pre-Celtic Tiger Ireland looms large, a place deined 
not by hope and optimism but by high unemployment, poverty and mass 
emigration20.
Since 2012, however, Ireland has been recovering. The GNP per capita has 
risen again21 and Ireland is back, close to the EU15 average (graph 1). In June 
2015, unemployment was still high at 9.7%22 but was nevertheless below the 
euro-zone average (11.1%23), tax revenues were rising. More importantly the 
2014 budget deficit fell below 4% of GDP24.
So the crisis sent Ireland backwards, but does not seem to have wiped out 
the progress made in recent decades. The trendline on Graph 1 shows that to a 
large extent the crisis “only” cancelled out the additional growth that happened 
after 1994, that is to say above the trendline. So was the crisis that Ireland went 
through only the correction of some excesses of the Celtic Tiger or was it more 
fundamentally the end of Ireland’s economic development model? What kind of 
crisis was it?
17.  John FitzGerald, “Where Did the €30bn in Cuts Go?”, he Irish Times, 17 February 2015. 
18.  CSO, Annual Population Change (Persons in April) (housand) by Component and Year, [http://www.cso.ie/
multiquicktables/quickTables.aspx?id=pea15], retrieved on 8 March 2015.
19.  Manfred Gärtner, Björn Griesbach, and Giulia Mennillo, “he Near-death Experience of the Celtic Tiger: A 
Model-driven Narrative from the European Sovereign Debt Crisis”, Discussion Paper no. 2013-21, Depart-
ment of Economics, U of St. Gallen, 2013, p. 13.
20.  Sean O’Hagan, “Enough is Enough: How to Build a New Republic by Fintan O’Toole – review”, he Guard-
ian, 21 November 2010. 
21.  GNP per capita: +0.5% in 2011, +3.6% in 2012, +2.8% in 2013, +5.2% in 2014. Calculations based on 
Eurostat, AMECO, op. cit.
22.  CSO, “Live Register, June 2015”, [http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/mue/monthlyunemploy-
mentjune2015/] (retrieved on 25 July 2015).
23.  Eurostat, “Unemployment statistics”, [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment_
statistics], retrieved on 25 July 2015.




• The end of Ireland’s economic development model?
The starting point of the crisis is often identified as the bursting out of the 
real estate bubble. However, it was only a trigger and the crisis was deeper and 
multi-faceted: a housing bubble by itself would hardly cause the near-bankruptcy 
of several banks, a sharp economic contraction, rising unemployment, a reduction 
of the standard of living of Irish people and a ballooning state debt which led to 
austerity measures that aggravated the crisis for a while.
Indeed, excesses in Ireland under the Celtic Tiger were not all directly linked 
to the real estate sector. The banking sector also participated as it fuelled the 
bubble: private sector credit more than doubled over the bubble years25. The 
problem is that the banking sector financed the boom by borrowing amounts 
abroad above their capacity to pay them back. Early warnings of an impending 
bubble were ignored26. Therefore, Ireland was rapidly contaminated by the US 
subprime crisis. Beyond the correction of excesses, exemplified by the real estate 
bubble, did the crisis reveal a fundamental weakness in Ireland’s development 
model?
Since 1958, Ireland has mainly implemented an export-led development stra-
tegy backed by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The Irish state has been very 
successful in attracting FDI thanks to a combination of factors. Some factors are 
the basic enablers of FDI: the Irish economy is open to international trade, its 
infrastructure is of a reasonable quality, it offers opportunities to export to an 
attractive region – the European Union. Additionally, Ireland has leveraged four 
specific factors: its overall low costs, its skilled workforce, a favourable tax struc-
ture and the critical mass it has reached in some industries. As Ireland is recove-
ring from the crisis, are these four specific factors still a competitive advantage for 
Ireland?
Before becoming the Celtic Tiger, Ireland always had sold itself as a low-cost 
country. After the recession of the 1980s, Irish labour costs were low compared 
to other EU countries, all the more since the government had implemented social 
partnership agreements between business leaders, labour, and the government to 
keep wages under control. However, with the Celtic Tiger, employees felt they 
deserved a larger share of the new wealth and wages rose significantly27. How can 
a country claim on the one hand to be a low-cost country and on the other hand 
25.  John FitzGerald and Ide Kearney (eds.), Medium-Term Review, 2013-2020, Dublin, ESRI, p. 6.
26.  he banking industry did not pay attention to “conventional early warning indicator of domestic imbalances, 
the current account of the balance of payments [because of the] membership of monetary union”. Ibid., p. 6.
27.  Sarah Voitchovsky, Bertrand Maitre & Brian Nolan, “Wage Inequality in Ireland’s ‘Celtic Tiger’ Boom”, he 
Economic and Social Review, Vol. 43, No. 1, Spring, 2012, p. 103.
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to have one of the highest GNPs per capita of the EU, as it was during the early 
2000s?
Business costs increased considerably during the Celtic Tiger period to the 
point that Ireland was no longer perceived as a low-cost country: some multina-
tionals even decided to relocate their manufacturing facilities to cheaper countries 
(Dell for example transferred PC assembly from Limerick to its new plant in 
Łódź, Poland in 2008/09; Aviva Hibernian relocated its back office and support 
services to India in 2008). During the crisis, overall Irish labour costs stagnated28 
and commercial property values collapsed by up to 67% from the peak years in 
2006-0729. Thanks to the crisis, Ireland now compares favourably with other EU 
core countries. However, there are now 28 member states within the EU, and 
compared to EU Eastern countries, Ireland is expensive, even after the crisis.
Since the mid-1960s, the Irish government has been investing in educa-
tion, understanding the need for a skilled and trained workforce to develop its 
economy and attract FDI. Ireland has emphasized the quality of its education 
system and especially its third-level education for years. The problem is that with 
the crisis, Ireland suffered a brain-drain of its skilled workforce as young people 
emigrated to find jobs worldwide30. Senior research and policy officer with the 
National Youth Council of Ireland Marie-Claire McAleer said:
Many of [Irish emigrants] are highly skilled and educated. his repre-
sents a brain drain and will inhibit our economic recovery. We need a 
pool of well-educated people to attract investment and stimulate and 
sustain economic growth31.
The Irish low corporate tax rate is often cited as a key success factor for attrac-
ting FDI in Ireland32. Since 1958, Ireland has implemented a generous fiscal 
policy. It was initially a zero corporate profits tax on manufactured exports. In 
1980, the zero rate was replaced by a flat rate of 10% on all manufacturing. Then 
in 2003 as a consequence of many pressures from the European Union, it rose to 
12.5%. However as all the EU member states compete to attract the same FDI 
28.  Between 2001 and 2008, labour costs rose on average by 4.8%. During the crisis, Irish labour costs rose by 
0.01%. Eurostat, “Labour cost index, nominal value – annual data”, [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/labour-
market/labour-costs/database], retrieved on 9 March 2015.
29.  Goodbody, “Irish Property”, [http://static.rasset.ie/documents/business/goodbody-property-market.pdf], retrieved 
on 9 March 2015.
30.  Helen O’Toole told a vivid example in the article “I turned into my mother, lying on their beds, sobbing”, he 
Irish Times, 6 February 2015. 
31.  Ciarra Kenny, “Emigration of Irish nationals falls 20% in year to April”, he Irish Times, 26 August 2014.
32.  Anne Anderson quoted in “Investment in Ireland: A Success Story”, National Foreign Trade Council, 23 Sep-
tember 2014, [http://www.nftc.org/newslash/newslash.asp?Mode=View&id=236&articleid=3883&category=All], 
retrieved on 10 October 2014. 
Vanessa Boullet
24 •
(R&D and high-tech FDI), Ireland’s particularly favourable rate is an increasing 
bone of contention.
However, Ireland’s low tax rate is not the part of the Irish fiscal system that is 
most challenged. Ireland is considered as a tax haven by some countries, like the 
United States33 because after the tech bubble burst in 2000, Ireland seems to have 
moved from a high-tech to a tax avoidance country in some companies’ views. 
Some American firms have indeed set up branches in Ireland to reduce their tax 
bills. The tax avoidance system enables companies to send their profits to zero-
tax island havens like Grand Cayman or Bermuda through Ireland. Those Irish 
subsidiaries sometimes have virtually no employee and pay no income tax. This 
mechanism was called the “double Irish” corporate tax mechanism34. Ireland 
was forced by the OECD35, the EU and the US to put an end to it. In October 
2014, Minister for Finance Michael Noonan introduced a new regime for cor-
porate taxation with the abolition of the corporate tax mechanism that enabled 
the “double Irish” scheme36. In the new tax code, multinational firms registered in 
Ireland will have to be tax resident. The old taxation scheme will be closed to new 
entrants from 2015 and phased out for existing multinational firms by 202037. 
To carry on attracting inward investment, the Irish government announced the 
introduction of different measures. The most important (and controversial) one is 
the establishment in 2016 of a new incentive, on top of R&D tax break schemes, 
to encourage companies to locate research in Ireland by offering them a lower 
tax rate on profits derived from intellectual property activity. It would be similar 
to the UK patent box, introduced in 2013 and restricted in 2015 following tax 
scrutiny by the EU and the OECD38. Will it be another Irish tax loophole? So 
far, Irish leaders have commented that tax policy was Ireland’s “sovereign right39”. 
33.  In a 2013 report, “An Analysis of Where American Companies Report Proits: Indications of Proit Shifting”, 
the US Congressional Research Service analysed two sets of countries, ive traditional economies (Australia, 
Canada, Germany, Mexico and the United Kingdom) and ive countries commonly identiied as being ‘‘tax 
preferred” or “tax haven” countries (Bermuda, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland)”.
34.  Proit-shifting: the United States has one of the world’s highest corporate tax rate (over 30%). In order to avoid 
paying high taxes, companies report their proits in low-tax or no-tax jurisdictions instead of the United States. 
Companies will only pay American proit taxes if they repatriate their proits to the United States.
35.  he Centre for Tax Policy and Administration has a unit working on “Base Erosion and Proit Shifting” 
(BEPS).
36.  Michael Noonan, “Finance Minister Michael Noonan – Budget 2015 speech”, Merrion Street Website, [http://
www.merrionstreet.ie/index.php/2014/10/inance-minister-michael-noonan-budget-2015-speech/], retrieved on 
18 October 2014.
37.  Suzanne Lynch, “Abolition of ‘double-Irish’ in Budget 2015 welcomed by EU tax commissioner”, he Irish 
Times, 14 October 2014.
38.  To avoid transfer pricing, the UK patent box relief would be restricted “to proits generated from IP that was 
initially developed in the UK”. “A fresh start for the UK’s patent box scheme”, LexisNexis PSL tax, 28 Novem-
ber 2014, [http://www.mmp-tax.co.uk/pdfs/A_fresh_start_for_UK_patent_box_28112014.pdf], retrieved 26 July 
2015.
39.  Anne Anderson quoted in “Investment in Ireland: A Success Story”, op. cit.
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However, the recent publicity around the cases of profit-shifting of high-tech-
nology firms such as Apple, Google, Facebook or LinkedIn and cases of “corpo-
rate inversions40” increased the intensity at which European and American policy 
makers put pressure on the Irish and Dutch governments.
Finally, over the years, Ireland has built strong innovative industrial clusters, 
based on the theory of Michael Porter41, in the main FDI sectors: ICT / software, 
pharmaceutical / chemical and international financial services. Industrial clus-
ters in Ireland date back to the Culliton Report in 199242, which recommended 
the promotion of industrial clusters focused on niches of national competitive 
advantage. Since then, the IDA (the Irish agency in charge of attracting FDI) and 
Enterprise Ireland have worked to target sectors that are “experiencing interna-
tional growth and that are thought to provide a good fit for Ireland’s resources 
and development aims43”. Now, the IDA tries to sell Ireland as an RDI location 
(Research, Development & Innovation) with the aim of creating new clusters:
IDA believes a range of sectors present opportunities for Ireland over 
the period of the strategy, including: internet of things, big data, security 
biometrics, smart ageing, portable services and inancial technology44.
To that end, on top of the abovementioned intellectual property tax scheme, 
the Irish State now offers a 25% R&D tax credit to “encourage companies to 
undertake new or additional RDI activity in Ireland45”.
Thus, the crisis may have slightly improved Ireland’s cost position, but the 
Republic is no longer a low-cost country. Its workforce is still highly educated, 
but the demon of its past, emigration, is back. The tax system is still very attrac-
tive but beleaguered and will most likely lose at least part of its appeal. Ireland 
has become a mature FDI country: it has lost some of its edge, but it has gained a 
track record, tangible in its industrial clusters which can reassure investors.
Since some pillars of the Irish economic development model have all but 
disappeared, what does Ireland’s economic future look like? Will the Irish growth 
40.  he US irm buys a foreign irm (avoiding paying tax on repatriated beneits since they were spent to buy the 
foreign company) and transfers its headquarters to the recently bought company, thus avoiding paying US tax 
in the future. Accenture moved its HQ in 2009 or Endo in 2014. “Tax avoidance: the Irish inversion”, he 
Financial Times, 29 April 2014.
41.  Michael Porter, he Competitive Advantage of Nations, New York, Free Press, 1990.
42.  he Industrial Policy Review Group, A Time for Change: Industrial Policy for the 1990s, Dublin, Stationery 
Oice), 1992.
43.  Frank Barry, “Foreign Direct Investment, Industrial Policy and the Emergence of an Irish Indigenous Software 
Cluster”, p. 4. [http://www.tcd.ie/business/staf/fbarry/papers/FDI,%20Industrial%20Policy%20and%20the%20
Emergence%20of%20an%20Irish%20Indigenous%20Software%20Cluster.pdf], retrieved on 11 March 2015.
44.  IDA Ireland, [http://www.idaireland.com/en/newsroom/ida-strategy/index.xml], retrieved on 11 March 2015.
45.  IDA Ireland, Research, Development and Innovation, [http://www.idaireland.com/en/business-in-ireland/activi-
ties/research-development-and-innovation/], retrieved on 11 March 2015.
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rate simply equal the other EU mature economies’ or can it slightly or signifi-
cantly outperform that of the EU core countries? If its current model has lost its 
edge, can Ireland invent a new development model?
• Will the Irish Tiger roar again?
The first question is whether Ireland still has significant potential to raise its 
GNP per capita? By 2013, Ireland had nearly caught up once more with some EU 
core countries46 (such as France or the UK). Still, several EU core member states 
had a better position. First, Luxembourg stood on its own with a GNP per capita 
(in thousands of units of purchasing power standard) of 43 in 2013 (compared 
with 29.4 for Ireland 31.3 for core countries on average). Luxembourg’s favou-
rable position was possibly related to its fiscal policies that some compared to 
those of a tax haven. Then, there was a group of countries with a GNP per capita 
approximately 10% higher than the one of Ireland’s: Sweden, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Denmark, and Germany. So, unless Ireland is ready to embark further 
on the risky path of a tax haven country, it could possibly expect to gain another 
10% of GNP per capita.
The ESRI (Economic and Social Research Institute) clearly states that Ireland’s 
future is tightly linked with the one of the European Union. How can a country 
whose economic future depends on the EU do more than mere catching up?
The pillars of Ireland’s economic development paradigm are based on Ireland’s 
competitive advantages over its neighbours to attract FDI. The cost of labour is 
– or used to be – one or Ireland’s competitive advantage, however in the 2000-
2013 period, average annual wages in Ireland grew faster than in other European 
countries (they exceeded Belgium’s and the Netherlands’ and in 2013 Luxem-
bourg was only 18% more expensive than Ireland while it was 32% in 2000)47 
It may be only a matter of time before the competitive advantages of lower 
wages and costs disappear or worse, become a liability. It would also be difficult 
for Ireland to claim that it has a more qualified workforce than other EU core 
countries. Ireland can only insist on the English language or the investment made 
on third-level education over the years. Finally, Ireland has developed industrial 
and financial clusters, but even if the ICT or pharma-chem clusters are well-esta-
blished in Ireland, all the EU countries are trying to create clusters in key FDI 
sectors, and it will be difficult for Ireland to keep its primacy. This only leaves 
Ireland with its tax advantage. This policy is very effective (12.5% in Ireland 
46.  31.1for Ireland vs 32.1 for core countries. Eurostat, AMECO, op. cit.
47.  OECD.Stats, “Average annual wages 2000-2013” [http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=AV_AN_
WAGE], retrieved on 26 July 2015.
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versus 20% in the UK for example), but the Irish corporate tax rate and its tax 
credits are increasingly challenged by the EU and the USA.
The comparison with more recent EU member states (in particular in the 
Eastern part of Europe) also has to be qualified. Ireland is more expensive but 
could possibly claim a more qualified workforce and a better track record. The 
main differentiator is again the tax policy but having copied the Irish develop-
ment model, Eastern EU countries are just above the Irish corporate tax rate 
with rates ranging from 15% to 25% except for Bulgaria with 10%48. If Ireland 
were forced to raise its corporate tax rate to 15%, it would reach the same level as 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania (16%). So, Eastern countries appear to be weaker 
rivals than EU core countries. Compared to Eastern countries, high-tech compa-
nies will be reassured by Ireland’s qualified workforce (including the English lan-
guage skills, since many high-tech firms are based in the United States), its track 
record and – in a sector with potentially sky-high and intellectual property-based 
profit margins – its tax system.
Nevertheless, attracting inward FDI into Europe appears to be more and more 
competitive and difficult. It seems unlikely that Ireland would be able to carry 
on attracting the lion’s share of FDI destined to Europe during the next decade. 
It is true that during the 2009-2013 period Ireland received more FDI compa-
red to the previous period (2004-2008). But it was exactly the same situation for 
Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and also Spain and Italy.
Thus, it seems that Ireland is no longer a fast-growing country. It now has 
many characteristics of a mature country. The Republic of Ireland could possibly 
try to play this game, with an Irish twist that would give it some extra growth 
compared to the rest of EU core countries. In this case, the main extra ingre-
dient would be its tax policy, combined of course with Ireland’s other competitive 
advantages: the language, the close relationship with the US and the EU, and the 
industrial clusters on IT & chemical products. This is summarized – possibly in 
an optimistic way – by Ireland’s Ambassador to the United States A. Anderson 
who declared:
After the di culties we experienced in the aftermath of 2008, our 
economy is back on its feet again – with buoyant foreign investment, 
rising exports, very healthy tourism, and reducing (even if still much 
too high) unemployment. he mix we provide – highly skilled work-
force, very competitive corporate tax rate of 12.5%, an English speaking 
48.  List on [http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/pages/corporate-tax-rates-table.aspx], 
retrieved on 11 March 2015.
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gateway to the European Union – continues to demonstrate its attracti-
veness49.
How does this translate into GNP projections? The Medium Term Review 
2013-2020 of the Economic and Social Research Institute considered three eco-
nomic scenarios for Ireland. Even more interesting than the scenarios themselves 
is the fact that the ESRI clearly states that Ireland’s future is tightly linked with 
the one of the European Union. In the “Recovery” scenario of the ESRI, the 
EU15 growth rate is to return to about 2% between 2015 and 2020 and Ireland 
will manage to almost double this growth rate over the same period if it addresses 
domestic issues such as the solidity of Irish banks, thus enabling Ireland to fully 
benefit from improved export outlets. In the “delayed recovery” scenario, the EU 
15 growth rate is also at about 2%, but Ireland will not manage to fix its domes-
tic issues. In the third scenario entitled “stagnation”, the EU 15 growth rate will 
remain lower than 0.5% but having addressed its domestic issues, Ireland will still 
reach 1.4%50. Interestingly, the ESRI does not dare consider the scenario where 
the EU 15 growth rate will remain slow and Ireland will not manage to fix its 
financial sector.
Projecting these figures on graph 1, with some simplification hypotheses51, it 
seems that the ESRI takes the catching up of Ireland with EU core countries as a 
key hypothesis. We can see these scenarios would lead to two possible outcomes 
by 2020 on graph 2. Outcome “A” corresponds to the “Recovery” and “Delayed 
recovery” scenarios of the ESRI: in this case, Ireland will catch up with the EU 
core countries and even outperform them. In outcome “B”, corresponding to 
the “Stagnation” scenario, Ireland and the EU core countries share the same dire 
future.
It is also interesting to note that both “recovery” scenarios (outcome A) 
more or less follow the trendline of ca. 4.3% growth per annum (from 1990 on 
graph 1) that Ireland may have followed without the excesses of the Celtic Tiger, 
49.  Anne Anderson, “Ireland, Europe and the US: A Road to Recovery and Renewed Partnership”, 29 May 2014. 
[https://www.dfa.ie/irish-embassy/usa/news-and-events/2014/ireland-europe-and-the-us/], retrieved on 11March 
2015.
50.  With the slight increase in the population (+16,500 in April 2014 and the population is forecast to grow). 
CSO, “GNP per capita will increase a bit less”. [http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/pme/population-
andmigrationestimatesapril2014/#.VPjV_HzF-], [http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/rpp/regionalpop-
ulationprojections2016-2031/#.VK6p48n2QqE], retrieved on 11 March 2015.
51.  All long-term planning exercises have intrinsic limitations. For instance, the ESRI considered that oil price 
would be around 100 USD per barrel in the period, while it is currently priced at ~60 USD, so we took the 
liberty to make some shortcuts so as not to overcomplexify the analyses. GNP growth rates are applied to 
GNP igures, assuming that population growth rate will not difer signiicantly between Ireland and EU core 
countries. GNP growth rates for 2019 and 2020 are not given by the ESRI for the delayed recovery scenario, 
so they are assumed to be the same as for 2018. GNP growth rate for EU core countries is assumed to be the 
same as GDP EU 15 growth rate.
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since corrected by the crisis. Thus the crisis could be seen as a harsh regulator 
of the Irish economic development. Having veered off its traditional position, 
Ireland was hit more than its neighbours to finally return to a path similar to that 
of the EU core countries.
To conclude, the crisis stopped or paused 15 years of exceptional Irish growth. 
It cancelled out the excesses of the Celtic Tiger and revealed the weaknesses of 
the development model policies. Now that the worst years of the crisis are pro-
bably behind us, the question is whether the Celtic Tiger is going to be able to 
roar again. The development model on which Ireland has based its development 
model for the last 60 years is clearly running out of fuel as many of the com-
petitive advantages that Ireland could boast in the early 1990s have disappeared 
one after the other. Ireland is no longer a peripheral developing economy but a 
developed one, economically close to the EU core countries. Nonetheless, so far 
Ireland has managed to preserve its most important competitive advantage to 
carry on attracting FDI: its tax system. But how long will it take for the EU and 
possibly the US52 to force Ireland to stop undercutting them thanks to its fiscal 
policy. Moreover two new threats are looming. The first one is the UK’s possible 
52.  In 2013, US Congress investigated the use of Irish companies by Apple to avoid paying taxes in the US. In 
2014, Barack Obama singled out Ireland for criticism. In 2015, US Congress introduced a bill to curb cor-
porate tax inversions. Simon Carswell, “Ending Double Irish’ should be start of tax changes – US lawmaker”, 
he Irish Times, 21 January 2015.
Figure 2: GNP per capita (PPS) - Ireland and Core EU Countries with projections by the ESRI for 2014-
2020 (Eurostat, AMECO, op.cit. & John FitzGerald and Ide Kearney [eds], op. cit.)
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exit from the EU. If the UK leaves the EU, tariffs will have to be collected on 
British exports entering the Republic. Therefore, both countries will be hit as they 
have integrated economies. Secondly, the European Union and the United States 
are trying to secure a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The 
aim is to create a virtually single market between the US and the EU. Full studies 
of the impact of the TTIP in Ireland have not been published yet and most obser-
vers and proponents of the TTIP tend to take an overall view: what is good for 
the EU as a whole is necessarily good for Ireland. Unfortunately, if Ireland has 
benefited from previous European developments so far, it does not mean that it 
will always be the case. The problem for Ireland is that the TTIP is likely to break 
the status quo and give US firms direct access to the European Union, which may 
rapidly undermine Ireland’s position as an easy entry point into the EU market. 
This is even truer given the importance of the chemical and pharmaceutical 
industries in Ireland (58% of Irish exports)53, most of which FDI-backed, very 
protected against US exports54 and focused by TTIP.
There is no obvious “new development” model for Ireland, but the country 
will have to learn how to promote its competitive advantage with investors, 
despite its position as a near-core EU country (from a GNP per capita point of 
view). The country will also have to build a new model for its society, since it can 
no longer hope to receive a windfall similar to the one of the Celtic Tiger years.
53.  “Irish goods export performance in 2013 back to 2008 level”, Finfacts Website, (retrieved on 10 October 2014).
54.  “he second key industry in this regard is the chemical and pharmaceutical industry (including cosmetics). 
In this sector, the barriers to US exports to the EU are between 15% and 35%, depending on the sub-sector, 
and between 9% and 15% in the other direction. In particular, the divergent regulation of chemicals (REACH 
in the EU and the Toxic Substances Control Act in the US) have increased rather than reduced the barriers”. 
Klaus Günter Deutsch, “Atlantic unity in global competition”, Deutsche Bank Research, EU Monitor, 19 Au-
gust 2013. [http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000318466/Atl
antic+unity+in+global+competition%3A+T-TIP+in+perspective.PDF], retrieved on 10 October 2014.
